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Abstract: Manabendra Nath Roy (1887-1954) was the founder of the Communist Parties of 
Mexico and India and a socialist-humanist philosopher. In the Western world, his works are 
today widely ignored and forgotten. This article introduces some philosophical aspects of Roy’s 
thought. It engages with foundations of his theory and shows its relevance for the study of 
communication, culture, technology, the human being, fascism, and nationalism. Frankfurt 
School thinkers such as Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and Erich 
Fromm were interested in similar topics to Roy. This article also compares the approach of 
Roy and the Frankfurt School. It shows parallels between Roy and the first generation of the 
Frankfurt School with respect to themes such as the dialectic of technology and society, the 
dialectic of the Enlightenment, fascism, nationalism, and authoritarianism. In the age of new 
nationalisms and authoritarian capitalism, global environmental crises, capitalist crisis, and the 
digital crisis, socialist-humanist theories such as M. N. Roy’s can inspire struggles for a hu-
manist and socialist society as antidotes to the acceleration and deepening of the three crises. 
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1. Introduction 
This article asks: How can M. N. Roy’s radical Marxist humanism inform the critical 
study of communication, culture, technology, the human being, fascism, and national-
ism? What commonalities are there between Roy’s approach and Frankfurt School 
critical theory? 
Manabendra Nath (M. N.) Roy (1887-1954) was a Marxist-humanist thinker and 
politician. As a humanist he opposed Stalinism, Gandhism and the Indian National 
Congress’ and its leader Subhas Chandra Bose’s political position towards Hitler and 
the Nazis, which placed him outside the mainstream of both the communist and the 
anti-colonial movements, contributing to “the forgetting of M. N. Roy” and his being 
“lost to the historical record” (Manjapra 2010, xiv). He experienced turmoil, wars and 
transitions in the 20th century and was a contemporary of Frankfurt School thinkers 
such as Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse. Coming from 
India and spending sixteen years (1915-1931) in countries such as the USA, Mexico, 
Germany, Uzbekistan, France, Luxembourg, and China (see Ray 2016a), he experi-
enced capitalism and colonialism in various parts of the world. 
 Both Roy and the Frankfurt School were inspired by Marx and humanism and were 
interested in topics such as the human being, technology, culture, communication, ide-
ology, liberalism, fascism, authoritarianism, and nationalism. Roy wrote his book Rev-
olution and Counter-Revolution in China in the late 1920s while connected to the 
Frankfurt Institute for School Research (Manjapra 2010, xiii, 70, 84, 91 [footnote 27]). 
In Germany, Roy and August Thalheimer became close friends and the former con-
versed in communist circles with the likes of Karl Korsch, Georg Lukács, Eduard Fuchs, 
Willi Münzberg, Franz Mehring, and Felix Weil (Manjapra 2010, 39-40; 67-70). The 
latter funded the founding of the Institute for Social Research.  
Subhrajit Bhattacharya (2016, 1432) points out that Roy and Horkheimer at the 
same time in the 1930s “sought to understand the regression of ‘civilisation’ in the light 
of philosophy, one in an Indian prison, another in his exile years in America”. Both Roy 
and the Frankfurt School took a critical interdisciplinary approach that combined polit-
ical economy, philosophy, sociology, psychoanalysis, and cultural criticism.  It is inter-
esting to compare the approaches of Roy and the first generation of the Frankfurt 
School respecting the themes of the human being, technology, culture/communication, 
ideology, liberalism, fascism, authoritarianism, and nationalism.  
As an introduction, some aspects of Roy’s biography will now be discussed (for 
details see Manjapra 2010; Roy S. 1997; Tarkunde 1982).  
Roy came from a Brahmin family in Bengal. He became a “full-blooded [Indian] 
nationalist” (Roy 1942, iii) who was convinced that Indian culture was superior to West-
ern culture and determined to organise an armed revolution against the British rule of 
India. Observers identify three stages in Roy’s political development: He “started as an 
ardent nationalist, became an equally ardent communist and ended as a creatively 
active Radical Humanist” (Tarkunde 1982, v).  
After the first phase in his political development Roy, in the second stage, became 
a communist when he went abroad during the First World War. Roy was a founder of 
the Mexican Communist Party in 1917 and the Communist Party of India in the 1920s. 
While staying abroad in the USA and Mexico he gave up the belief that there was a 
progressive element in nationalism and embraced aspects of Western culture (Roy S. 
1987, 1-13). In the 1920s, he was a member of the Communist International (Comin-
tern)’s Presidium.  
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At the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920, Lenin (1920) presented Theses on 
the National and Colonial Questions. Lenin argued that the “entire [communist] policy 
on the national and the colonial questions should rest primarily on a closer union of the 
proletarians and the working masses of all nations and countries for a joint revolution-
ary struggle to overthrow the landowners and the bourgeoisie” (1920, 146). Roy (1920) 
presented Supplementary Theses on the National and Colonial Question that were 
more detailed than Lenin’s theses and resulted in Lenin’s taking up and agreeing with 
Roy’s inputs. In his theses, Roy (1920) argued that European capitalism “depends on 
control of extensive colonial markets and a broad field of opportunities for exploitation” 
in order to counter overproduction, that the “super-profits made in the colonies form 
one of the main sources of the resources of contemporary capitalism”, and that there-
fore the “Communist International must enter into much closer connection with the rev-
olutionary forces that are at present participating in the overthrow of imperialism in the 
politically and economically oppressed countries”.  
Roy was expelled from the Comintern in 1929. He was close to Bukharin, whom 
Stalin wanted to get rid of, and supported anti-Stalinist Marxist movements such as the 
Communist Party of Germany (Opposition) (KPO), whose leader August Thalheimer 
was Roy’s friend and ally. Both Thalheimer and Roy were part of the International 
Communist Opposition. Communists around Thalheimer and Heinrich Brandler op-
posed the Stalinist position that the social democrats were the main enemy of the 
working class. Stalinists described social democrats as “social fascists”, and did not 
focus enough on the critique of Nazi-fascism. Members of the Communist opposition 
movement such as Thalheimer argued for a united front of social democrats and com-
munists against Nazi-fascism. Roy wrote for the KPO’s publications and found the no-
tion of the united front of the exploited and oppressed feasible for struggles in the col-
onies (see Roy 1929a; 1929b). In the late 1920s, Stalin and his followers in the Com-
intern such as Otto Wille Kuusinen disagreed with Roy’s assessment that the “nation-
alist bourgeoisie” in the colonies was compromising with imperialism but rather claimed 
that “the Indian bourgeoisie was brutally suppressed by Imperialism” (Roy 1943, 48-
49).  
Consequently, Stalinists started to oppose Roy, which resulted in his expulsion 
from the Comintern (see Ray 2016b). The Stalinists accused the likes of Thalheimer, 
Brandler, and Roy of “Luxemburgism” (Manjapra 2010, 43-44; 70-71; 86-87), which, 
given Rosa Luxemburg’s fusion of socialism, Marxism, and humanism, Roy and his 
comrades did not take as an insult but as confirmation that they were true communists. 
Roy (1943, 47) argues that the Communist International’s failed assumption that “So-
cial Democracy was a greater enemy of revolution than Fascism” resulted in the Com-
intern helping “Fascism to capture power in Germany”. Roy argues that it was a grave 
mistake that Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov “held British Imperialism respon-
sible for the war and thus, by implication, exonerated Fascism” (Roy 1943, 59-60). 
Orthodox Marxists have characterised socialism as the ideology of the working 
class, which implies the need for dictatorship. They forgot that for Marx the interest of 
the working class “coincided with the interest of the entire society” (Roy 1943, 72), 
which is why socialism and Marxism are “the philosophy of the progressive mankind. 
The world can be reconstructed as a home of freedom and culture only along the lines 
indicated by Marxism. Therefore, Communism has come to its own. It has become the 
future of mankind, its heritage” (73). For Roy, the Soviet system wasn’t communist. He 
argued that a true form of communism as radical-democratic humanism remains the 
important political goal and interest of humanity. 
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In his third, humanist phase, Roy combined Marxism and humanism. In the 1930s, he 
joined the Congress Party, where he was active in the socialist faction. He broke with 
Congress during World World II over the question of how the party should position itself 
towards Nazi-fascism and the Allied powers. Roy argued that fascism was the world’s 
greatest danger and for the support of the Allies. Others in Congress, such as Gandhi, 
said that there should only be support on the condition of Indian independence. Gandhi 
saw Roy as his “enemy number one” (Roy S. 1987, 17), while Roy characterised Gan-
dhi as “the patron saint of [Indian] nationalism” (Roy S. 1987, 67; Roy 1968, 29). 
In 1932, Roy was sentenced to twelve years in prison for having conspired to de-
prive the King Emperor of his sovereignty in India in the 1920s. The time he served 
was reduced; he was released in late 1936. He was a vocal critic and opponent of 
Italian and German fascism. Roy founded the League of Radical Congressmen in 
1938, the Radical Democratic Party in 1940, and the Radical Humanist Movement in 
1948. The Radical Humanist Movement in 1952, together with other humanist move-
ments, founded the International Humanist and Ethical Union that is today known as 
Humanists International. 
Whereas Roy during his communist phase argued for “[r]evolutionary nationalism” 
(1922, 177), which he distinguished from “reactionary nationalism” (1922, 166, 216; 
see the same phrases in Roy 1923, 42, 44), during his humanist phase he opposed 
“capitalist as well as socialist Nationalism” (Roy 1960/1947, 102) and argued that any 
nationalism is “a totalitarian cult” (1960/1947, 84) that needs to be replaced by the 
universal “brotherhood of free individuals” (1960/1947, 102) and the “cosmopolitan 
commonwealth of free men and women” that is “ not compatible with the continuation 
of National States” (Roy 1953, 35). 
Although some attention has been given to Roy’s work in India, his philosophy and 
theory is widely forgotten. Roy’s magnum opus Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, 
which has a great deal in common with Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlight-
enment, is a forgotten and undiscovered work. In September 2019, Roy’s main book 
that was published in two volumes in 1952 (volume 1) and 1955 (volume 2) had just 
23 citations on Google Scholar1. One of the purposes of this article is therefore to point 
critical scholars in the social sciences, humanities, communication and cultural studies 
towards Roy’s works by introducing some of its important aspects.  
In order to answer the research question that this article poses, it discusses four 
aspects of Roy’s works and assesses their relevance for a critical theory of communi-
cation and culture. These themes are humanism (Section 2), technology (Section 3), 
culture and communication (Section 4), and ideology (Section 5). Section 6 draws 
some conclusions.  
2. Humanism 
Roy was both a humanist and a Marxist. He understood humanism as a romantic 
movement (Section 2.1) and engaged with Marx’s works in the context of humanism 
(Section 2.2). 
2.1. Humanism as Romanticism 
Roy was a radical humanist and humanist Marxist. Humanism stresses the importance 
of the capacity of humans to change society. It is based on the insight that “man is the 
maker of his world” (Roy 1953, 47) and the assumption that the human being is “the 
archetype of society” (Roy 1960/1947, 94). Marx 
                                            
1 Data source: https://scholar.google.com/, accessed on 12 September 2019. 
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was a passionate Humanist; and, with a burning faith in revolution, he was also 
a romanticist. The idea of revolution is a romantic idea, because it presupposes 
man’s power to remake the world in which he lives. If purposeful human effort 
is left out of account, social development becomes a mechanistic evolutionary 
process, making no room for sudden great changes and occasionally acceler-
ated tempo. As the prophet of revolution, Marx was a romanticist. He proclaimed 
his faith in the creativeness of man which, accelerating the process of social 
evolution, brought about revolutions. Marx being a Humanist, the force of his 
theory of revolution was its powerful moral appeal (Roy 1953, 17). 
For Roy, humanism is built on the insight that the human being “is essentially rational 
and therefore moral. Morality emanates from the rational desire for harmonious and 
mutually beneficial social relations” (Roy 1953, 33). Radical humanism “thinks in terms 
neither of nation nor of class” (1953, 34), but in terms of the human being. Roy fore-
grounds the role of human activity in society: history “is the record of man’s struggle 
for freedom” (1989, 4). For Roy, romanticism means the “passionate belief in the cre-
ativeness and freedom of man. […] The idea of revolution, therefore, is a romantic 
idea. […] The difference between reason and romanticism is that one perceives what 
is necessary and therefore possible, whereas the other declares impetuously what is 
desirable, what should be done” (1989, 11). 
In society, the human being “is the measure of everything”, which implies that “the 
merit of any pattern of social organisation or political institution is to be judged by the 
actual measure of freedom it gives to the individual” (Roy 1953, 38). Comparable to 
Marx, Roy argues that co-operation is the essence of society (Roy 1953, 38). Marx 
adds that co-operation is a social production process and a work process, which is why 
the economy is of particular importance in society (see Fuchs 2020a). Roy (1953) says 
that the experience of conflict results in the alienation of humans from co-operation 
and a loss of faith of humans in themselves (91) that means a “crisis of the soul of 
man” so that “man has forgotten what he is” (91). 
A free humanist society requires the realisation of the co-operative essence of so-
ciety: “Freedom is the progressive elimination of all the factors – physical, social, psy-
chological which obstruct the unfolding of man’s rational, moral and creative potential-
ities. The function of social relationships should be to secure for individuals, as individ-
uals, the maximum measure of freedom” (Roy 1953, 38). For Roy, freedom  
is the supreme value of life, because the urge for freedom is the essence of 
human existence. […] [The human being’s] urge for freedom […] is undying, 
eternal. He may not be always conscious of it; often he is not. Nevertheless, it 
is the basic incentive for him to acquire knowledge and conquer environments 
by knowing them (Roy 1989, 496-497). 
In his main philosophical work Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, published in two 
volumes in 1952 and 1955, Roy (1989) describes the history of how humanism, ration-
ality, science, philosophy, art, education, and technology have since the time of the 
Renaissance challenged religious and supernatural authority and the struggles and 
contradictions involved in this development. Roy argues that modern science and phi-
losophy were not created by the bourgeoisie, but that later the bourgeoisie “patronised 
them because they served their purpose” (1989, 46). He stresses that Arab philosophy 
was important for rescuing reason and the thought of ancient Greece while Europe 
was stuck in the Middle Ages (1989, 41). Arab thought “ultimately reached Europe to 
stimulate the age-long struggle for spiritual freedom and search for truth” so that the 
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“examination of social political freedom – modern civilisation – resulted from that strug-
gle” (1989, 74). Roy (1989, 42, 68-69, 74, 128, 314) especially foregrounds the im-
portance of Averroes (1126-1198) and Avicenna (980-1037), who built on Aristotle to 
establish a rationalist and materialist philosophy.  
Roy’s stress on Averroes and Avicenna is comparable to the work of Ernst Bloch 
(2019), who in his book Avicenna and the Aristotelean Left stresses the importance of 
Avicenna and Averroes who “embraced transformation“ (67) and advanced a “specu-
lative materialism” (67). Whereas the Right Aristotelians believe in supernatural pow-
ers that kept humans from struggling for liberation, Left Aristotelians struggle for hu-
manism.  
Humanism is internationalist and cosmopolitan; it wants to organise society as a 
“cosmopolitan commonwealth of free men and women” combined with “a spiritual com-
munity, not limited by the boundaries of National States – capitalist, fascist, communist 
or of any other kind – which will gradually disappear under the impact of cosmopolitan 
Humanism” (Roy 1953, 35).  
A radical humanist society includes cultural democracy: “Its culture will be based 
on universal dissemination of knowledge and incentive to scientific and all other kinds 
of creative activity” (Roy 1953, 46). Roy argues that 
side by side with the efforts to change economic conditions, efforts should be 
made to create a cultural atmosphere in which the value of freedom will be ap-
preciated by a larger and larger number of people, an atmosphere in which it 
will be possible to make more and more people feel the urge for freedom, feel 
that they are human beings and as such capable of experiencing freedom, here 
and now (1950a, 188-189).  
Freedom requires “economic betterment and [democratic] political institutions” (1950a, 
191) as well as a culture of “freedom of thought and judgment” and the advancement 
of “the spirit of enquiry and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong” (190).  
Roy opposes both economic and political forms of dictatorship. He argues for eco-
nomic, political and cultural democracy: “According to Marx, under Socialism, human 
reason will overcome irrational forces which now tyrannise the life of man” (1953, 18). 
Roy argues for a radical humanist society that is a grassroots democracy based on 
people’s committees in politics and co-operatives in the economy. In such a society, 
local democracy is strengthened (1953, 43). Such committees are also “the school for 
the political and civic education of the citizen” (1953, 36). For Roy (1989, 474), human-
ist democracy is “a network of local political schools”: “Every citizen will be informed 
and consulted for his opinion about the affairs of the state, that is, the political admin-
istration of his society” (Roy 1949, 939).  
The humanist economy produces for human needs (Roy 1953, 46). It consists of 
a network of consumers’ and producers’ co-operatives, and the economic activ-
ities of the society shall be conducted and co-ordinated by the people through 
these institutions. The co-operative economy shall take full advantage of mod-
ern science and technology and effect equitable distribution of social surplus 
through universal social utility services (Roy 1953, 69).  
A radical humanist democracy is based on “People’s Committees as the primary con-
stituents of the democratic State, and co-operatives as the primary units of the co-
operative Commonwealth” (1953, 70): “Economic democracy is no more possible in 
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the absence of political democracy than the latter is in the absence of the former” 
(1989, 472). 
Roy (1989, 355-358) argues that Kant’s (1724-1804) idealism is based on a dual-
ism of ideas and the thing-in-itself, subject and object, noumenon and phenomena, 
appearance and reality, science and philosophy, and nature and mind; and that it there-
fore developed a dogmatic ethics that together with the approaches of Herder (1744-
1803), Fichte (1762-1814), and Lessing (1729-1781) advanced German nationalism. 
Roy (1989, Chapter XVIII) writes that Hegel’s (1770-1831) dialectical philosophy over-
came Kant’s dualism, stressing the creativity of the human mind and therefore human-
ism.  
Roy points out that Marx has an “outstanding place in the history of philosophy” 
because his “materialist monism” questions the dualism of mind and matter by seeing 
matter “as the ultimate reality capable of producing life” (1989, 417). Roy again and 
again discusses the relationship of Marx and humanism. 
2.2. Marx and Humanism 
Roy (1989) argues that Marx’s “view of history and social evolution was essentially 
teleologically fatalistic” (390). This view is disproved by Marx’s famous formulation from 
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that humans “make their own history, but 
they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen 
by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted 
from the past“ (1852, 103). History is conditioned by society’s contradictions so that 
social struggles and human practices are the sources of a freedom that goes beyond 
and liberates humans from necessity. History is based on a dialectic of structuration 
and collective agency/struggles. 
Roy contradicts his own claim that Marx was a historical fatalist when appreciating 
Marx’s stress on agency and revolution: “The romantic view of life […] leads to the 
liberating doctrine that man is the maker of the world, developed during a whole period 
of history from Vico to Marx. […] Marxism is an attempted synthesis between the two 
apparently antithetical views of life – the rationalist and the romantic” (1989, 12).   
Roy (1989) argues that the dialectic is for Marx a rational, scientific law, “Hegelian-
ism applied to human history” (408), and that he combined rationalist dialectics with a 
romanticist theory of revolution (409-410; 412) so that history is for Marx a “contradic-
tion between rationalism and the romantic notion of revolution” (411). Because of his 
“emphasis on human action” (412) and his “burning faith in revolution” (420), “Marx 
was a Humanist, and as such a romanticist” (411). Marx’s philosophy is a “synthesis 
of rationalism and romanticism” (413). Roy states that “Marx being a humanist, the 
force of his theory of revolution was its moral appeal. […] In the last analysis, Capital 
is a treatise on social ethics – a powerful protest against the servitude of the toiling 
majority” (420).  
Roy argues that Marxism needs to be freed from “the fallacy of economic determin-
ism”, which makes it consistent with “Radical Humanism” (421). In the last instance, 
Roy greatly appreciates Marx as a humanist and revolutionary theorist. But he misin-
terprets Hegelian dialectics. Dialectics does not just operate at the level of objective 
contradictions but also at the level of human practices. There is a dialectic of the sub-
jective dialectic and the objective dialectic. And for Marx, class struggle is the subjec-
tive dimension of history because the exploited class thereby questions the class rela-
tion, by which it is compelled to produce surplus-value that it does not own, and class 
society. Class struggle as the making and unmaking of class relations between the 
exploited and the exploited is the subjective dimension of history. 
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Marx’s quote from the Eighteenth Brumaire does not have, as Roy assumes, a roman-
tic-revolutionary side (humans make their own history) and a dialectical side (they do 
so under the dialectical contradictions of class society). It does not combine a non-
dialectical and a dialectical aspect of society but expresses society’s meta-dialectic of 
the objective dialectic and the subjective dialectic. Both dimensions of history are dia-
lectical. We cannot say therefore, as Roy (1989, 491) does, that the “fiery prophet of 
social justice in Marx was more a Humanist than a Hegelian”. Rather, Marx’s dialectic 
is humanist and his humanism dialectical. The problem of economic determinism and 
breakdown theory is not immanent in Marx’s application and development of Hegelian 
dialectics but was the result of, on the one hand, the Bernstein-tradition of social dem-
ocratic revision of Marx’s theory and, on the other hand, the Stalinist tradition of the 
vulgarisation of Marx.  
Roy says that Marx’s insight in the sixth Feuerbach thesis that the individual and 
the human being’s essence are “the ensemble of the social relations” (Marx 1845, 7) 
was “a great advance in the struggle for freedom” (Roy 1989, 392). Roy claims that 
Marx ignores that the activities of individuals constitute society (1989, 392). He says 
Marx omits “mental activity” and “conceptual thought” in society and social evolution 
(393) and “the human nature which underlies the ensemble of social relations” (395). 
He writes that by neglecting human nature Marx does not recognise “permanent val-
ues” that enable ethics (396). Roy (1989, Chapter IX) here limits his discussion to the 
German Ideology and ignores other works of Marx. In Capital, Marx stresses how con-
ceptual thought, mental activities and human will guide human work: 
 
what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect 
builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour 
process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at 
the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change of 
form in the materials of nature; he also realizes [verwirklicht] his own purpose in 
those materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the mode 
of his activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it (Marx 
1867, 284). 
 
Roy did not focus on Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts where Marx iden-
tifies a dialectic of the individual and social structures as the foundation of society: 
 
just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him […] 
Social activity and social enjoyment exist by no means only in the form of some 
directly communal activity and directly communal enjoyment […] that which I 
make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself 
as a social being. […] Above all we must avoid postulating “society” again as an 
abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social being.  […] Man's 
individual and species-life are not different, however much – and this is inevitable 
– the mode of existence of the individual is a more particular or more general 
mode of the life of the species, or the life of the species is a more particular or 
more general individual life (Marx 1844, 298-299, emphasis in original). 
 
In the German Ideology, the Marxian work Roy (1989, Chapter XIX) is referencing in 
his discussion, Marx says that the starting point of the analysis of society is “the exist-
ence of living human individuals” (Marx and Engels 1845-1846, 31). It is not true that 
Marx does not assume there is no human nature. His whole concept of alienation is 
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based on the notion of human essence. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 
Marx (1844) points out that the human being is in essence a natural, social, objective-
subjective, conscious, self-conscious, sensual, thinking, active, creative, language-us-
ing, working being. He also bases a critical humanist ethics on this notion of human 
essence that advances the insight that class society alienates humans, cripples human 
nature, and is therefore incompletely human and incompletely social. As a conse-
quence, communism is “practical humanism” and “humanism mediated with itself 
through the supersession of private property” (Marx 1844, 341).  
Written in 1844, the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts were first published in 
the original German in 1932. Martin Milligan created the first English translation, pub-
lished in 1959. Roy died in 1954 and was not fluent in German, which means that he 
could not read the Manuscripts. If he had, his judgement of Marx might have been 
somewhat different. His criticism of Marx can also be read as a self-criticism of his own 
earlier phase where he relied much more on determinism and economism than in his 
later stage. Above all, Roy’s critique should not be seen as relating to Marx, but to the 
Stalinists that he opposed by the humanist stress on human agency and democratic 
socialism.  
Since the start of a new world economic crisis in 2008, we have experienced not 
just a brief spring of progressive movements but also the rise and spread of new na-
tionalisms, new authoritarianisms, and new fascism (Fuchs 2018; 2020b). Once again, 
“[b]ourgeois society stands at the crossroads, either transition to socialism or regres-
sion into barbarism” (Luxemburg 1916, 388). Engaging and updating the works of hu-
manist socialists such as Roy, Ernst Bloch, Raya Dunayevskaya, Erich Fromm, Lucien 
Goldmann, C.L.R. James, Henri Lefebvre, Rosa Luxemburg, Herbert Marcuse, Karl 
Marx, E. P. Thompson, Raymond Williams, and so on, reminds us that democratic 
socialism is the strongest weapon against fascism, nationalism, and war. 
Humanism shaped how Roy saw various aspects of society, such as technology. 
The next section discusses his view of the relationship between technology and soci-
ety.  
3. Technology 
Roy was a critic of technology as a means of exploitation and domination, but favoured 
an alternative, non-capitalist modernity that involves a humanist use of technology. 
Roy differed in this respect from Gandhi (Section 3.1). He provides a dialectical anal-
ysis of technology (Section 3.2). 
3.1. Roy and Gandhi 
We have already mentioned in the introduction of this article that there was no love lost 
between Roy and Gandhi. Roy questions the identity of anti-imperialism and national-
ism (Roy 1942, 3). He says that the disappearance of British imperialism is a precon-
dition for freedom in India, but that this disappearance will not “necessarily mean free-
dom for India” (1942, 3). He sees nationalism as an unnecessary and dangerous fea-
ture of certain anti-imperialist movements, and as having fascist potentials. In the con-
text of India and the Second World War, Roy was particularly critical of “the fact […] 
that the sympathies of the average Indian nationalist are all on the side of the Fascist 
Powers” (1942, 14). Roy believed that the support of the Nazi-fascists by Indians who 
hated British imperialism would not result in the end of imperialism but in the rise of 
fascism in India. He opposed any form of nationalism and argued that with the advent 
of Gandhi’s influence, “authoritarianism became the fundamental principle of Indian 
Nationalism”, because Gandhi “demanded submission to a spiritual authority” (Roy 
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2006/1945, 12): “Gandhism is the accepted ideology of Indian Nationalism” 
(2006/1945, 26).  
Roy argues that Indian nationalists “reject precisely what is ‘good’ in capitalist civi-
lisation”, namely “the tremendous advance of science, in theory and practice” (1950b, 
109). Gandhism’s focus on “non-violence, poverty, continence” (1960/1947, 19), and 
“[p]uritanism” (1960/1947, 20) inspires “the capitalist and his employees to work hard 
and spend little, thus making possible the accumulation of capital”, which is why “the 
Mahatma’s teaching has acquired great prestige among the capitalists of India” 
(1960/1947, 20). 
Gandhi had a particular view of what role technologies should play in society. He 
was critical of industrialisation and modern technologies because he saw them as dis-
ruptors of traditional life. Gandhi says in this context:  
 
I don't believe that industrialization is necessary in any case for any country. It is 
much less so for India, Indeed I believe that independent India can only discharge 
her duty towards a groaning world by adopting a simple but ennobled life by de-
veloping her thousands of cottages and living at peace with the world. High think-
ing is inconsistent with a complicated material life, based on high speed imposed 
on us by Mammon worship. All the graces of life are possible, only when we learn 
the art of living nobly (Gandhi, in Tendulkar 1953, 224-225). 
 
Gandhi sees machinery as the cause of imperialism, or what he terms the exploitation 
of one nation by another: 
 
What is the cause of the present chaos? It is exploitation, I will not say, of the 
weaker nations by the stronger, but of sister nations by sister nations. And my 
fundamental objection to machinery rests on the fact that it is machinery that has 
enabled these nations to exploit others (Gandhi, in Bose 1948, 64-65). 
 
These quotes show that Gandhi equates and conflates modern technology and indus-
try on the one side with capitalism and imperialism on the other side. He does not see 
the possibility of an alternative, socialist modernisation. He furthermore sees technol-
ogy as the cause of exploitation. This position is different from techno-optimist deter-
minists such as Marshall McLuhan who see modern technologies as the enablers and 
causes of a better future. Gandhi is a representative of pessimistic technological de-
terminism that assumes that modern technologies with necessity call forth and are the 
cause of negative features of society such as commodification and exploitation. Both 
optimistic and pessimistic technological determinism share the short-sighted assump-
tion that it is technology that determines society. They disregard how society shapes 
the character and use of technology and that the relationship of technology and society 
is dialectical and therefore full of contradictions.  
Gandhi favoured the widespread use of manual technologies, especially the spin-
ning-wheel and the handloom. He argued that “[r]estoration […] of the spinning-wheel 
solves the economic problem of India at a stroke” (1997, 165): “When as a nation we 
adopt the spinning-wheel, we not only solve the question of unemployment but we 
declare that we have no intention of exploiting any nation, and we also end exploitation 
of the poor by the rich” (1997, 167). Gandhi saw the spinning wheel as “the panacea 
for the growing pauperism of India” (1983/1948, 441). His view of technology is anti-
modern and focused on preserving and advancing manual labour and thereby toil. 
Gandhi’s view of manual technologies is, just like his view of modern technologies, 
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techno-deterministic. He assumes that the spinning wheel and the handloom result in 
a society without poverty.  
Gandhi overlooks that technology is “being looked for and developed with certain 
purposes and practices already in mind” (Williams 2003/1974, 7). As Williams states: 
“Technological determinism is an untenable notion because it substitutes for real so-
cial, political and economic intention” (2003/1974, 133). The impacts of technology on 
society are shaped by interests and contradictions in society. In capitalism, there cer-
tainly is an “interlock of military, political and commercial intentions” at play in the de-
sign and use of science and technology (Williams 2003/1974, 137). But there is also 
the potential for shaping science and modern technology by democratic interests (Wil-
liams 2003/1974, 146). 
Roy (1950b, 124) does not just criticise that Gandhi and his followers want an “eth-
ical capitalism”, which means that they overlook how capitalist interests shape science 
and technology and call forth negative consequences; he also argues that the “core of 
Gandhism […] is its hostility to industrialism and the modern world” (1960/1947, 18). 
For Roy, Gandhi’s preaching of the abstention from the use of technology and a simple 
rural life is an ideology that celebrates poverty and thereby supports the profit interests 
of capitalist organisations: “The spiritualist doctrine of self-control, simple living, volun-
tary poverty, fits in with the requirements of unsocial capitalism” (1950b, 236). 
Roy argues that there is a dialectic of technology and society. 
3.2. The Dialectic of Modern Technology and Society 
Roy shared concerns about modern technology but rejected technological determin-
ism. He argued that technology should be seen in the context of society and therefore 
has potentials to advance both slavery and freedom:  
 
the emphasis on freedom at this time is called for by a material factor, namely, 
modern technology. There is a very wide-spread fear that this immense develop-
ment of technology will bring slavery for mankind, and the fear is not unreasona-
ble. The Nazis were only a little ahead of their time when they tried to set up a 
single world tyranny, and if such a tyranny is ever established it will be almost 
impossible to overthrow. Thus this great development of technology puts the 
problem before us in the form of a choice: world slavery or world freedom (Roy 
1960/1947, 12). 
 
Roy sees modern technology as standing in a dialectical relationship to society, which 
means that technology has certain unpredictable dynamics, but is shaped by humans’ 
interests, which means that in principle humans can by practicing overcoming domina-
tion and exploitation also shape and create technologies that advance freedom, equal-
ity and democracy. Roy argued for the creation of humanist technologies as part of the 
struggle for a humanist society. “Machine should not be the Frankenstein of modem 
civilisation. Created by men, it must subserve man's purpose – contribute to his free-
dom” (Roy 1953, 40). He writes that there can be no freedom without humanistic mod-
ern technology:  
 
Technology is capable, in principle, of providing an enjoyable life for all, and there 
is no good reason why life should not be enjoyed […] Freedom, equality and 
democracy are impossible if you reject modern technology (Roy 1960/1947, 21).  
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Progressive satisfaction of material necessities is the precondition for the individ-
ual members of society unfolding their intellectual and other liner human attrib-
utes. An economic reorganisation such as will guarantee a progressively rising 
standard of living will be the foundation of the Radical Democratic State (Roy 
1953, 46). 
 
While Gandhi was an anti-modernist, Roy argued for an alternative modernity, a so-
cialist-humanist modernity that shapes, creates and uses technologies in manners that 
abolish toil and advance freedom, democracy and sustainability: 
 
Science not only enables man to conquer nature, but also helps him to under-
stand nature, his relation with it and with other human beings who are integral 
parts of nature. […] Modern technological trends threaten to offer mankind at the 
altar of the Moloch, and create a Frankenstein lusting to devour its creator, be-
cause the practical, utilitarian value of scientific knowledge has been allowed to 
eclipse its ideal value (Roy 1947a, iii). 
 
There are strong parallels between Roy’s and Herbert Marcuse’s analysis of modern 
technology. Like Roy, Marcuse rejects anti-technological ideology that celebrates toil: 
“The enemies of technics readily join forces with a terroristic technocracy. The philos-
ophy of the simple life, the struggle against big cities and their culture frequently serves 
to teach men distrust of the potential instruments that could liberate them” (Marcuse 
1998/1941, 63). 
Marcuse, just like Roy, identifies both emancipatory and repressive potentials of 
modern technology and argues that the actual character and impact of technology de-
pends on broader societal contexts, interests and struggles: “Technics by itself can 
promote authoritarianism as well as liberty, scarcity as well as abundance, the exten-
sion as well as the abolition of toil” (Marcuse 1998/1941, 41). Marx and Roy base their 
analysis on Marx’ Hegelian analysis of technology that stresses that there is an antag-
onism between the essence of modern technology and the actual impacts of technol-
ogy under capitalist conditions. Marx, for example, argues that  
machinery in itself shortens the hours of labour, but when employed by capital 
it lengthens them; since in itself it lightens labour, but when employed by capital 
it heightens its intensity; since in itself it is a victory of man over the forces of 
nature but in the hands of capital it makes man the slave of those forces; since 
in itself it increases the wealth of the producers, but in the hands of capital it 
makes them into paupers (Marx 1867, 568-569). 
Marcuse, like Roy, argues for a socialist modernity where technology is shaped and 
used in manners that overcome toil and advance freedom and technology is governed 
in a democratic manner:  
 
If everyone has become a potential member of the public bureaucracy […], soci-
ety will have passed from the stage of hierarchical bureaucratization to the stage 
of technical self-administration. […] We have pointed to the possible democrati-
zation of functions which technics may promote and which may facilitate complete 
human development in all branches of work and administration. Moreover, mech-
anization and standardization may one day help to shift the center of gravity from 
the necessities of material production to the arena of free human realization. […] 
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Technological progress would make it possible to decrease the time and energy 
spent in the production of the necessities of life, and a gradual reduction of scar-
city and abolition of competitive pursuits could permit the self to develop from its 
natural roots. The less time and energy man has to expend in maintaining his life 
and that of society, the greater the possibility that he can “individualize” the 
sphere of his human realization (Marcuse 1998/1941, 58-59; 63; 64). 
 
In digital capitalism, we find both techno-optimism and techno-pessimism. In this con-
text, the effects of AI-based automation is a heavily discussed topic. 
The futurist Martin Ford (2015) warns in his book Rise of Robots: Technology and 
the Threat of a Jobless Future that AI-based automation “has a dark side of its own, 
and if it results in widespread unemployment or threatens the economic security of a 
large fraction of our population” (2015, 283). He writes that  
factory jobs are disappearing across the globe at a rapid clip. Labor-intensive 
manufacturing as a path to prosperity may begin to evaporate for many devel-
oping nations. […] The greatest risk is that we could face a ‘perfect storm’ – a 
situation where technological unemployment and environmental impact unfold 
roughly in parallel, reinforcing and perhaps even amplifying each other” (Ford 
2015, 283; 284). 
Accelerationists such as Srnicek and Williams (2015) and Bastani (2019), in contrast 
to Martin Ford, point out that AI-based automation should be entirely welcomed. 
Srnicek and Williams (2015, 179) say that “the automation of mundane labour” forms 
“the basis for a fully postcapitalist economy, enabling a shift away from scarcity, work 
and exploitation, and towards the full development of humanity”.  
Bastani (2019) argues that new technologies will result in a major disruption of so-
ciety, creating “a world dramatically different from our own” (11): “the old world will 
transition to the new more quickly than many imagine” (2019, 77); and “within a gen-
eration we are set to reach peak human” (2019, 80), ushering in the emergence of 
fully-automated luxury communism, “a society in which work is eliminated, scarcity re-
placed by abundance and where labour and leisure blend into one another” (2019, 50). 
Williams and Srnicek (2013) state that “[w]e want to accelerate the process of techno-
logical evolution. […] the left must take advantage of every technological and scientific 
advance made possible by capitalist society. We declare that quantification is not an 
evil to be eliminated, but a tool to be used in the most effective manner possible”. 
Whereas accelerationists see Artificial Intelligence ushering in communism, neolib-
erals see it as a way of accelerating corporate profit-making. The conservative UK 
government argues in its Industrial Strategy that “[e]mbedding AI across the UK will 
create thousands of good quality jobs and drive economic growth” (Department for 
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 2019). 
While utopian communist optimism and neoliberal optimism expect changes from 
new technologies that they assess as positive (communism and capitalist growth re-
spectively), pessimists argue that new technologies result in a rise of unemployment, 
precarity, inequalities, social problems, and so on. The basic problem of all of these 
approaches is that they do not see modern technology in modern society as a complex, 
contradictory system but rather inscribe certain societal changes into technology. The 
actual effects of society depend on the results of class and social struggles that shape 
the character and use of technology in society.  
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In the next section, we will discuss aspects of Roy’s works that have to do with culture 
and communication. 
4.  Culture and Communication 
Roy developed a distinct form of cultural materialism as part of which he discussed the 
materialist character of society (Section 4.1) and the relationship of culture and the 
economy (Section 4.2). He had less to say on communication, but his analysis of cul-
ture can inform the critical analysis of communication (Section 4.3).  
4.1. Materialism and Society 
One basic question for any critical theory is how mind and matter as well as culture 
and economy are related. In Marxist theory, this question is known as the base/super-
structure-problem.  
For Roy, the entire world is material. Materialism is “the explanation of the world 
without the assumption of anything super-natural” (Roy 1940, 227). Matter is “a vibra-
tory substance” (Roy 1947a, 86), “the sole existence” (1947a, 99), “the only reality” 
and “ontologically real” (1947a, 100). Roy argues that in society, both “ideal and phys-
ical” (1989, 8-9) realities are material, have “their respective dynamics or dialectics” 
and are “mutually influenced” (9). Roy advanced a materialist theory of knowledge. 
“Man’s relation with nature has been from the very beginning not of passive contem-
plation, but of action” (Roy 1940, 249). Therefore, “knowledge is action, not passive 
contemplation” (249); “whatever is within the ken of human consciousness is material. 
Because, something immaterial (spiritual, in the traditional sense) can never be cog-
nisable to human mind, itself a product of matter in a particular state of organisation” 
(251). 
Roy’s philosophy is monistic and materialist. He stresses that the non-human and 
the human world are material. For Roy, the human being is entirely material because 
the body and the mind are physical entities developed in the course of evolution. In the 
realm of humans and their societies, Roy stresses the dialectical interaction of 
ideas/physical reality, mind/body, nature/society, environment/individual, and econ-
omy/culture. All of these realms are expressions of matter as a dynamic, vibratory pro-
cess. There are no ideas without the human mind’s embeddedness into and interaction 
with the body and a natural and social environment. 
Roy deals with the question of the means of production in society. He stresses that 
the brain is humanity’s key means of production: 
 
But may we not ask who created the first means of production? What was there 
originally? Did the first man appear with hammer and sickle in hand? No. But he 
did come into the world with another means of production, the most powerful ever 
created. And that was his brain […] We are all born with it, and it remains our 
basic asset, provided that we can appreciate its worth and make proper use of it. 
If you prefer a crude hammer, or even an electric hammer, or something still bet-
ter, the most modern technological inventions, to your brain, I wish you luck (Roy 
1960/1947, 65-66). 
 
The creation of the first extra-organic means of production was a deed done by 
an animal with highly developed brain, capable of thought. An idea preceded the 
creation of the first means of production (Roy 1960/1947, 93). 
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The brain is a means of production, and produces the most revolutionary com-
modity (Roy 1953, 36). 
 
Roy (1989, 17) stresses that conceptual thought is characteristic of humans. Concep-
tual thought is “thinking stimulated by mental images” (1989, 17). “Conceptual thought 
depends on language. So, it can be said that man is fully differentiated from his animal 
ancestry only when he coins words for expressing definite ideas” (17). Animals articu-
late sounds but this activity is entirely dependent on stimuli from their immediate envi-
ronment; they lack conceptual thought (17). This means that humans have the capacity 
to anticipate and reflect on the consequences of their actions, select among different 
potential actions, make moral judgements that guide their actions, and discuss and 
communicate their feelings, actual and potential choices, interests, experiences, mor-
als, and actions. Humans are rational, anticipatory, self-conscious, thinking, creative, 
moral, languaging, social, communicative, societal beings. Roy (1989, 479) argues that 
the human being is “a thinking animal”. But humans are also social, communicative 
beings.  
What needs to be added to Roy’s approach is the crucial role of work and produc-
tion in human existence (see Fuchs 2020a). Based on their capacities as rational, 
thinking, creative, social beings, humans engage in the social production of ideas, 
technologies that they use to transform the world, goods that satisfy human needs, 
collective decisions, worldviews, and culture. They together produce an economy, a 
political system, and culture, i.e. forms of sociality and social relations. Work is the 
process of social production through which humans create something new that satis-
fies their needs. Social production means that the economy and work are at the heart 
of all social realms, including the political and cultural life. At the same time, social 
systems go beyond mere production by having emergent qualities. Once humans pro-
duce structures, these structures have specific features and a particular logic that go 
beyond economic necessity and are shaped by human interests and their contradic-
tions.  
The dialectic of culture and the economy is based on social production, which 
means that the combination of the human capacities to produce and to be social are 
at the heart of all realms of society, including the economy and culture. Each social 
realm is based on social production that forms the material foundation of humans and 
society. Each social realm also has particular, emergent dynamics and contradictions 
that cannot be reduced to production. The capacity for social production is itself a com-
bination of the capacity to form and communicate ideas and the capacity to experience, 
engage with and transform the environment, i.e. a dialectic of communication and 
work. Social production combines the work character of communication and the com-
municative character of work (Fuchs 2020a).  
An important question for any theory of society is that of how culture and the econ-
omy are related. 
4.2. Culture and the Economy 
Roy challenges the assumption that culture and ideas are reducible to the economy 
and therefore derive from economic structures, i.e. productive forces and the relations 
of production. He stresses that culture has a particular logic that is based on and influ-
ences human experiences and events in society: 
The logical development of ideas and the generation of new social forces take 
place simultaneously, together providing the motive force of history. But in no 
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given period can they be causally connected except in the sense that action is 
always motivated by ideas” (Roy 1989, 10). 
We do not accept the Marxist doctrine that moral values, cultural patterns, aes-
thetic tastes, are all ideological super-structures of economic relations […] the 
so-called ideological super-structure is not hanging in the air; that it too has its 
own roots. Ideas, undoubtedly, are influenced by social experience, influencing, 
at the same time, social and historical events. But they have a logic and dynam-
ics of their own (Roy 1960/1947, 70-71).  
Ideation is a physiological process resulting from the awareness of environ-
ments. But once they are formed, ideas exist by themselves, governed by their 
own laws. […] Cultural patterns and ethical values are not mere ideological su-
per-structures of established economic relations. They are also historically de-
termined – by the logic of the history of ideas (1953, 52). 
For Roy, ideologies and ideas are “structures standing by themselves” and not super-
structures (1960/1947, 71). Materialism means for Roy that the productive forces do 
not determine history because they are “the collective expression of the creativeness 
of man, and the creative man is always a thinking man” (1989, 8). This means that 
humans, because of their self-consciousness and “the creative role of intelligence” 
(1989, 8), have the capacity to make choices, to envision the future, to identify and act 
based on interests, and to organise and act collectively.  
In his book Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China, Roy (1946/1930, 3; 6-7), 
following Plekhanov, argues that “social evolution” is determined by “the natural con-
ditions and forces of production” (1946/1930, 3). Roy therefore argues, for example, 
that in ancient China, the “evolution of private property […] was caused by the devel-
opment of the means of production”, and that the “progressive perfection of tools in the 
hands of man – the development of the means of production – again is determined by 
physical conditions” (1946/1930, 17). The problem with this view is that technology, 
nature and work as aspects of the forces of production do not operate independently 
but within definite social relations between human beings. The views of Roy and Plek-
hanov disregard the relations of production and are therefore prone to a naturalistic 
and technological determinism. Roy’s critique of economic determinism during his last, 
humanist phase of intellectual development was partly also self-criticism of his earlier 
thought. 
Humanism is both a worldview and a political movement. Any movement has a 
worldview that guides and interacts with its practices. There is a dialectic of ideas and 
practices. The rise of various humanist movements is not reducible to the economic 
structure of feudalism but stands in the context of class and social struggles and there-
fore collective social practices. Humans who oppose a certain social order and organ-
ise themselves engage in collective practices and develop collective ideas that guide 
their collective struggle. Marx’s father was a relatively well-situated lawyer. Engels’ 
father owned large textile factories in Salford (UK) and Barmen (Prussia). Rosa Lux-
emburg’s father was a timber trader. George Lukács’ mother was the heir of a rich 
timber trading family and his father was a bank director. These examples show that 
the class and family backgrounds of those who engage in certain movements do not 
mechanically determine their political positions and the question of whether they join 
certain movements. That there is a relative autonomy of ideas so that ideas are socially 
produced and interact with economy and society means that political position and 
worldview cannot be read from and are not determined by class background. 
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Marx points out that once a certain ideology becomes historically attached to a class, 
this class supports and creates individuals and groups who develop this ideology. He 
speaks of a “division of mental and material labour” (Marx and Engels 1845-1846, 60) 
in the ruling class: “inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its 
active, conceptive ideologists, who make the formation of the illusions of the class 
about itself their chief source of livelihood)” (Marx and Engels 1845-1846, 60). The  
 
individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things conscious-
ness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine 
the extent and compass of an historical epoch, it is self-evident that they do this 
in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers 
of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: 
thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch (Marx and Engels 1845-1846, 
59).  
 
Given a division of labour in the ruling class, one cannot assume that capitalists directly 
determine the ideas disseminated with the help of books, public debates, business 
schools, the media, and so on. Intellectuals have their own logic and interests and in 
the first instance often strive to accumulate reputation and not monetary capital. With 
the help of funding, donations, consultancy, cultural networks, the support of think 
tanks, the ownership of media, etc., capital exerts indirect pressure on the realm of the 
production of ideology. At the same time, ideologues who strive for reputation are also 
keen on shaping the ideas of members of the ruling class and the political elite in order 
to increase their own reputation. Similar things can be said about the relationship of 
intellectuals and politicians who strive to accumulate power. 
There is a complex relationship between ideologues, political actors and economic 
actors in capitalist society. They strive towards accumulating reputation (ideologues), 
power (political actors) and money capital (capitalists). Insofar as these logics coincide, 
they enter mutually beneficial relations that can develop their own contradictions and 
can therefore also break down. 
In some, but certainly not all passages of his writings that focus on culture, it seems 
that Roy sees culture as almost independent from political economy, simply saying that 
his approach is materialist because everything including ideas is material. The conse-
quence of such an assumption is a materialist dualism where the whole world is mate-
rial, while within society there are independent material substances, namely culture 
and the economy. Culture cannot be reduced to political economy; however, it is also 
not fully independent but grounded in the economy, and at the same time relatively 
autonomous.  
Roy (1947b, 898) argues that Marx’s suggestion that being determines conscious-
ness implies that “man’s ideals are shaped by the tools with which he works”. However, 
a mode of production does not only consist of the productive forces but also interacts 
with the relations of production. Marx suggests that consciousness is embedded into 
society’s social relations because humans are ensembles of social relations, which 
means that technology is not, as assumed by technological determinism, the determin-
ing factor of society. Rather, social relations are the determining factor of culture, ideas, 
politics, and the economy, which means that society only exists in and through humans’ 
social relations. 
Marx argues that the mode of production is not simply the “physical existence of 
the individuals”, but “a definite form of activity of these individuals” in which they ex-
press their lives (Marx and Engels 1845-1846, 31). It is “a definite mode of life” (Marx 
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and Engels 1845-1846, 31): “The production of ideas, of conceptions, of conscious-
ness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse 
of men – the language of real life” (36). Material production includes “[c]onceiving], 
thinking, the mental intercourse of men” (36), “mental production as expressed in the 
language of […] politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc.” (36). This means 
that for Marx ideas are material entities and thinking is a material process. And the 
production of ideas is a social process. Culture as the production and circulation of 
ideas and meanings takes place within the ensemble of social relations that constitutes 
the human subject. Marx and Engels stress that ideas depend on the social relations 
of the humans who think, create, share, and reproduce them:  
 
Ideas can never lead beyond an old world order but only beyond the ideas of the 
old world order. Ideas cannot carry out anything at all. In order to carry out ideas 
men are needed who can exert practical force (Marx and Engels 1845, 119). 
 
Undeterred by this examination, the French Revolution gave rise to ideas which 
led beyond the ideas of the entire old world order (Marx and Engels 1845, 119). 
 
In respect to Marx’s (1845-1846) passages from the German Ideology mentioned in 
the preceding paragraph, Roy (1989, 393-394) argues that Marx does not see that 
consciousness is foundational for human activities. This assessment is flawed: Marx 
conceives of consciousness as material because the brain is a material system. And 
self-consciousness enables human freedom:  
 
free, conscious activity is man's species-character. […] Conscious life activity dis-
tinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that 
he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a 
conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that 
is his activity free activity. Estranged labour reverses this relationship, so that it 
is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life activity, his es-
sential being, a mere means to his existence (Marx 1844, 276). 
 
The struggle against religious and monarchic authority has expressed itself not just in 
the realm of politics and the economy but also in realms such as philosophy, science, 
art, education, and literature, i.e. in cultural forms. The political-economic and the cul-
tural movements and social forms that challenged the feudal social order that domi-
nated the Dark Ages all shared certain goals and interests but did not originate from 
the same people and were not organised within one overall unified, consistent move-
ment. The Enlightenment was a political-economic and cultural movement consisting 
of many strands that challenged the feudal system’s economic, political, and cultural 
structures. 
As one example for the relationship of ideas and the economy, Roy discusses the 
relationship of humanism and the bourgeoisie: “Renaissance Humanism was not the 
ideology of the rising bourgeoisie” (1989, 79). Humanism rather started and developed 
as a movement that challenged religious, monarchic, aristocratic, feudal authority and 
rule. It took on different forms, including liberalism, reactionary romanticism, socialism, 
and communism, which means that humanism is a contradictory movement. 
Liberalism developed in the sixteenth century independently from the economy “ac-
cording to the logic of the evolution of thought” (1989, 300). Later on, “a particular 
class” – the bourgeoisie – “accepted it” (300). Roy argues that given this sequence, 
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liberalism is not “the ideology of the bourgeoisie” and the “philosophy of capitalism” 
(300, see also 303; 318). He writes that liberalism and capitalism developed simulta-
neously and concomitantly (302) and sees liberalism as going beyond economic phi-
losophy and extending into politics and the ways of life (301-302). For Roy, the origin 
of liberalism is “the movement for the secularisation of politics” (303). He argues that 
liberalism did not originate as a capitalist project but was at a certain point of time 
adopted and shaped by the bourgeois class.  
The classical liberal thinkers John Locke (1632-1704) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1679) predominantly focused on political philosophy. Thinkers such as Adam Smith 
(1723-1790), Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), David Ricardo (1772-1823), James Mill 
(1773-1836), and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) extended classical liberalism from pol-
itics to political economy. As a consequence, classical political economy developed. 
These thinkers combined economic and moral philosophy. In contrast to Locke and 
Hobbes, they lived at the time of the decay of feudalism, the emergence of industrial 
capitalism, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution. It is certainly true, as Roy 
argues, that liberalism did not originate as the ideology of capitalism, but as a broader 
ideology and philosophy that in the 18th and 19th centuries was turned into the ideol-
ogy of capitalism. This was not an accident but had to do with the search of the rising 
bourgeoisie for an ideology guiding its practices and justifying its interests.   
A certain mode of production or phase of development of the economy does not 
result in a single dominant idea system or form of culture. Ideas and culture cannot be 
read off the mode of production. We can learn from Roy that a mode of production 
influences but does not determine forms of culture. In relation to a particular mode of 
production, a variety of cultural forms and cultural contradictions exist. In his Introduc-
tion to the Grundrisse, Marx (1857) speaks in this context of “the uneven development 
of material production relative to e.g. artistic development” (109, emphasis in original) 
and stresses that in “the case of the arts, it is well known that certain periods of their 
flowering are out of all proportion to the general development of society, hence also to 
the material foundation, the skeletal structure as it were, of its organization”. This 
means that culture can but does not necessarily have to flourish in periods of political-
economic crises. A crisis of political economy can but does not have to be accompa-
nied by the demise of dominant cultural forms and the emergence of radical cultural 
novelties. 
Communication is an important theme of cultural theory that the next sub-section 
addresses.  
4.3. Communication 
For Roy (1950a), culture has to do with the ways we experience the world and with the 
intellectual and emotional world. Communication is a key feature of culture. Wherever 
there is communication there is culture, and wherever we communicate we produce 
and reproduce culture. Marx argues that “neither thoughts nor language in themselves 
form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life” (Marx and 
Engels 1845-1846, 447). And actual life is the “ensemble of the social relations” of 
individuals, groups, social systems and society (Marx 1845, 7). Culture and communi-
cation exist as social relations in which humans produce meaning in the world. These 
cultural relations exist in connection to society’s ensemble of social relations and the 
ensemble of social relations that humans engage in. 
Roy (1940) argues that “[s]ense-perceptions, human experience, gained not in pas-
sive contemplation (it cannot be done that way), but in active functioning of the human 
organism, and having for their source the material world existing objectively outside 
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our consciousness, independent of it, is the point of departure of all knowledge” (1940, 
252). He writes that   
knowledge is derived not in passive contemplation, but in action. ‘Philosophers 
have interpreted the world in various ways, but the real task is to transform it’. 
Only in the process of transforming the world continuously, does the store of 
human knowledge endlessly increase; and the knowledge of a given epoch is 
valuable in so far as it enables man to transform the world, thereby opening a 
new epoch of progress (1940, 268). 
Roy states that “[k]nowledge is possible because there is a causal connection between 
mind and matter” (1947a, 195). Ideas “represent the knowledge of things” (195); they 
result from mental activities (196); “[k]nowledge results from perception, which is or-
ganic reaction to physical contacts” (195). We must add that knowledge is not only 
formed by humans engaging with physical environments but also with social environ-
ments. Humans interact with things when they touch, feel, move, and change them, 
but things do not talk; they have no language. In the social and societal environment, 
humans act as languaging, communicating beings so that they interact symbolically 
with each other, which means that they interpret each other and form meanings of each 
other.  
Living beings react to the world they are part of and that they experience, which is 
why humans establish a relationship between mind and the world (198). Knowledge is 
at the same time objective and subjective (198): knowledge is the subjective, mental 
act of cognising the world (202) that constructs knowledge as an object in the human 
mind (203). Perception is the process that puts the human subject in relation to the 
world. Knowing/cognition builds on perception. It is “not a tacit reception or recoding of 
messages from the external world” (204-205), but an “intelligent reaction” to “mes-
sages” that “are stimuli” and sense data (205) gained through experience: “Cognition 
is an interpretative, denotative, selective, act” (205); “[k]nowledge is a conceptual 
scheme born out of the insight into the nature of things, gained through critical exami-
nation, rational co-ordination and logical deduction of perceptual data” (206). 
Roy does not discuss communication in detail, but we can build on his insights. We 
can apply Roy’s ideas to the communication process: in communication, humans es-
tablish relations between their minds and thereby between individuals that constitute, 
produce, and reproduce the social world. They produce and reproduce social relations 
(Fuchs 2020a). When human beings A and B communicate, then A constructs B as an 
object in A’s mind and B constructs A as an object in B’s mind. They sense, perceive, 
cognise, and experience each other, and react to each other’s messages by making 
meaning of them and creating and externalising symbols as a response. For communi-
cating, humans use their brains as major intellectual means of production, and linguis-
tic and symbolic means of communication through words, grammar, bodily move-
ments, etc. Words are “vehicles for the expression and communication of […] emotions 
and ideas” (Roy 1989, 7); “[l]anguages develop to serve the purpose of coordinating 
disjointed ideas and emotions” (Roy 1989, 7).  
Communication is the process through which humans make meaning out of each 
other. In communication, they mutually reveal ideas, i.e. interpret the world, to each 
other. Communication is the production of social relations where at least two humans 
externalise knowledge in symbolic forms, and cognise each other and each other’s 
ideas, such that they interpret the other and their ideas. In communication, humans 
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create messages that reach other humans, beginning a perception and cognition pro-
cess that results in the construction of a mutual knowledge of each other. Communi-
cation is the mutual externalisation of knowledge through the human sense organs, 
and the internalisation of externalised knowledge. Given that, for Roy, cognition is an 
active process, communication that is based on cognition is also an active production 
process: communication is the human production and reproduction of social relations 
(Fuchs 2020a).  
The realm of culture, i.e. the production and communication of ideas and meanings, 
is an important aspect of Roy’s theory of society. Roy also gives particular attention to 
the critique of repressive ideas, namely the ideologies of nationalism and fascism. The 
next section discusses his analysis of ideology.  
5. Ideology: Liberalism, Capitalism, Nationalism, Fascism 
“An ideology is a system of ideas; in other words, an ideology is the ideal sanction for 
social and political practices” (Roy 1960/1947, 67). Roy has a general understanding 
of ideology and differs in this respect from thinkers such as Georg Lukács (1971, 66), 
who sees ideology as reified consciousness that legitimates the interest of the ruling 
class by trying to “deceive the other classes and to ensure that their class conscious-
ness remains amorphous”, or Theodor W. Adorno, who understands ideology as  “a 
consciousness which is objectively necessary and yet at the same time false, as the 
intertwining of truth and falsehood” (Adorno 1954, 189).  
Such critical concepts of ideology stress the illusionary and manufactured character 
of ideas that make up an ideology and their legitimating role in class structure. Roy 
speaks of an “ideal sanction for social and political practices”, which can in one sense 
be understood as the legitimation of class relations but is on the other hand formulated 
in a very general manner, such that, seemingly, for Roy ideology exists in all society 
and not just, as for Lukács, in class societies.  
Leaving aside problems of definitions, Roy in his works analyses the ideological 
structure of some of the main ideologies of the capitalist age, namely liberalism (Sec-
tion 5.1), nationalism and fascism (Section 5.2), which resonates with the Frankfurt 
School’s analyses (Section 5.3)   
5.1. The Dialectic of Enlightenment 
The Enlightenment was a movement against the power of the church, the monarch, 
and the aristocracy. In the 19th century, liberalism started taking on the form of utilitar-
ianism. Thinkers such as David Hume (1711-1776), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), 
James Mill (1773-1836) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) influenced utilitarian thought. 
Roy states that 
the liberal doctrine of laisser faire served the purpose of rising Capitalism; and 
the rule of law came to be the rule of a minority which under the given circum-
stances had the power to make laws. Liberalism appeared to provide a moral 
justification of the economic exploitation of man by man and a philosophical 
sanction for the modern political theories which subordinated the individual to 
the State (Roy 1989, 330).  
Liberal practice has in capitalism undermined the principle of freedom and liberties for 
all. 
Utilitarianism’s principle of maximising individual utility and happiness as much as 
possible and doing so for the greatest number of individuals is for Roy based on a 
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“clash of two categorial imperatives” (Roy 1989, 340): individualistic and collectivistic. 
The one side of this antagonism bears a potential for the advancement of economic 
individualism in the form of laissez faire-style capitalism that postulates profit maximi-
sation with no government intervention in the economy (342). The other side of the 
antagonism fetishises collectivism (the happiness of the largest number of people) at 
the expense of universal rights of all individuals. “The orthodox utilitarian dictum logi-
cally justifies suppression of a minority even of forty-nine (because fifty-one is a greater 
number)” (347). It therefore has the potential to provide “a moral sanction for the vari-
ous totalitarian cults” (340), to undermine “the equality of men”, to advance the “nega-
tion of Democracy”, and to herald “the advent of dictatorship” (345). 
An example of utilitarian logic can be found in debates on the British referendum to 
leave the European Union. Prime Minister Boris Johnson has repeatedly used utilitar-
ian arguments for justifying the need for a “hard Brexit” without an agreement between 
the EU and the UK. Johnson identifies “the people” as those who support Brexit. Here 
are two examples of this demagogic logic of reducing “the people” to those who support 
Brexit: 
 
Boris Johnson: “What I think people want us to do is to leave the European 
Union on October 31st” (BBC 2019). 
 
Boris Johnson: “But the way to unite the country, I am afraid, is to get this thing 
done. […] What people want to see is a resolution and they want to see us get 
this thing done. And that’s what we’re gonna do” (Johnson 2019). 
 
In Britain’s 2016 EU referendum, 51.9 percent of the voters opted for Brexit and 48.1 
percent against it. This means there is a very large minority that Johnson excludes 
from his notion of the people. He speaks in favour of the majority and argues for the 
interest of the largest group of voters while disregarding the interests of the minority. 
The result is that he advances the political polarisation of the country into two hostile 
camps.  
The basic problem of utilitarianism is that its ethical foundations deny “the perma-
nence of moral values” (Roy 1989, 340). Utilitarian ethics is a “relativist morality” and 
“ethical nihilism” (341). The result is that utilitarianism has both potentials for the fet-
ishization of individual interests (capitalism’s individualism without socialism) and the 
fetishization of (partial) social interests (collectivism without individuality such as in fas-
cism and Stalinism). It lacks a commitment to universalism (universal rights) and an 
ethical and political dialectic of individual and social rights. 
Roy (1989) argues that positivism and empiricism fetishize scientific knowledge as 
“a mathematical god” and is a “neo-mysticism” (456; see also 457). Positivism is one 
aspect of utilitarian liberalism. The logic of calculability supports the accumulation of 
capital and power because it allows the reduction of society to the instrumental logic 
of costs and benefits. 
There are parallels of Roy’s critique of positivism to the analysis advanced by 
Frankfurt School authors such as Friedrich Pollock, Theodor W. Adorno, Max Hork-
heimer, Jürgen Habermas, and related thinkers such as Alfred Sohn-Rethel and Georg 
Lukács.  
The Frankfurt School stresses the instrumental character of positivism. Pollock and 
Adorno, two key members of the Frankfurt School, argue that the rise of mathematics 
in the social sciences denotes the “convergence of social-scientific methods toward 
those of the natural sciences” and is “the child of a society that reifies people” (Pollock 
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and Adorno 2011, 20). For Horkheimer (2004/1947, 41), “[p]ositivism is philosophical 
technocracy”. Habermas (1971, 67) warns that positivism is the “immunization of the 
sciences against philosophy”. Horkheimer and Adorno (2002/1947, 25) argue that the 
logic of calculation is the foundation of barbarism: “With the spread of the bourgeois 
commodity economy the dark horizon of myth is illuminated by the sun of calculating 
reason, beneath whose icy rays the seeds of the new barbarism are germinating”.  
Alfred Sohn-Rethel was not a member of the Frankfurt School but was in contact 
with Adorno, with whom he shared the critique of positivism. Sohn-Rethel (1978) ar-
gues that class society’s division of labour includes the separation between head and 
hand. Positivism is the fetishism of mechanistic, quantifying, mathematical reasoning. 
It is an expression and result of the division of labour.  
Georg Lukács inspired the Frankfurt School’s analysis of instrumental reason. Lu-
kács (1971) points out that positivism is anti-dialectical: “The methodology of the nat-
ural sciences which forms the methodological ideal of every fetishistic science and 
every kind of Revisionism reject the idea of contradiction and antagonism in its subject 
matter” (1971, 10). Mathematics does not see “the whole system at once” (117). The 
logic of quantification reduces explanations to basic principles (reductionism) and be-
lieves in the exact predictability and calculability of the world (determinism) (117). 
In the contemporary social sciences and humanities, digital positivism has emerged 
as a new form of positivism. It propagates quantitative digital methods, namely big data 
analytics. The social sciences are thereby re-envisioned as computational social sci-
ence, a paradigm focused on large datasets, quantification, mathematics, and calcu-
lation. Such approaches set out to explain the world based on the analysis of big stocks 
and flows of data. The problem is that the analysis of big data does not tell us every-
thing that matters. It cannot properly study human motivations, feelings, experiences, 
norms, morals, values, interpretations, concerns, fears, hopes, etc. It lacks a focus on 
society’s qualities.  
Roy (1953, 8) argues that there is a contradiction between “the philosophy and the 
political practice of Liberalism”. Capitalism’s “cut-throat competition” undermined de-
mocracy and resulted in “the stormy rise of Fascism” (9). Roy observed how the failures 
of liberalism resulted on the one hand in fascism and on the other hand in Stalinism, 
the fetishization of the collectives of the nation and the working class: “A political sys-
tem and an economic experiment which subordinate the man of flesh and blood and 
to an imaginary collective ego, be it the nation or a class, cannot possibly be the suit-
able means for the attainment of the goal of freedom” (1953, 53-54).  
Roy describes and analyses a negative dialectic of the liberal Enlightenment 
whereby the alienation caused by liberalism let liberalism turn against itself and its own 
political and moral values, which called forth terror and violence. According to Roy, 
19th-century liberalism’s utilitarianism, its “law of the jungle” (1989, 428), and its atom-
ising individualism called forth “the superman cult” (428), cults of collectivism (427), 
irrationalism (428, 445), “the cult of leadership” (445), and dictatorship (445). The result 
was “the mystic collectivist cult” (436) of fascism and Stalinism: “In modern Liberalism, 
the individual became the economic man. […] But in the context of the capitalist soci-
ety, the economic man could exist either as a slave or as a slaveowner. That debase-
ment of the individual discredited the liberal democratic doctrine of individual freedom. 
[…] Ultimately, democracy was destroyed in a fierce clash of totalitarian dictatorships” 
(Roy 1989, 464), namely fascism and Stalinism. Roy says that humans created a ma-
chine that now enslaves them (477) so that the “struggle for freedom […] ultimately” 
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deprives humans of freedom (477). The “creations of man have reduced man to noth-
ingness”, which means the “complete subordination of the creator to his creation”. Marx 
(1844) termed this process alienation. 
The rise of fascism in Europe was one of the consequences of the Enlightenment’s 
negative dialectic: 
In Europe, Fascism represents a reaction to the negative features of the capi-
talist civilisation, namely, lonesomeness and helplessness of the individual, re-
sulting from his atomisation. These features are accentuated in the period where 
the progressive potentialities of capitalist economy are exhausted, and monop-
olist capitalism increases the degree of social insecurity, particularly for the mid-
dle and lower classes. In that period, the reaction becomes more violent, and 
the cultural sanctions of the capitalist civilisation – humanism, rationalism and 
liberalism – are assaulted (Roy 2006/1945, 22).  
Liberal individualism and atomism that expresses itself as the exploitation of wage-
workers, the fetishization of private property, capital accumulation, cut-throat competi-
tion, and the logic of the accumulation of capital in the economy and of power in the 
state-system has backfired. The social void it created has been filled with movements 
for repressive collectivism. Whereas liberal individualism fetishizes the individual at the 
expense of social freedom, fascism and Stalinism fetishize the collectives of the nation 
and the state at the expense of individual freedom. Roy (1989, 477) argues that in 
contrast, a radical humanist democracy has to “reconcile individual freedom with social 
organisation”.  
In respect to liberalism’s self-contradiction, we find parallels between Roy’s work 
and Horkheimer and Adorno’s (2002/1947) Dialectic of Enlightenment. Horkheimer 
and Adorno (2002/1947, xvi) argue that capitalism entails the tendency of the “self-
destruction of enlightenment” (2002/1947, xvi), resulting in “the reversion of enlight-
ened civilization to barbarism” (xix). Capitalism’s structures of exploitation and domi-
nation turned against liberalism’s enlightenment values and in the last instance re-
sulted in Auschwitz: “After the brief interlude of liberalism in which the bourgeois kept 
one another in check, power is revealing itself as archaic terror in a fascistically ration-
alized form” (68). 
Horkheimer (2004/1947, v) points out that in capitalism, Enlightenment tends to 
nullify itself and transform into its opposite, namely dehumanisation: “Advance in tech-
nical facilities for enlightenment is accompanied by a process of dehumanization. Thus 
progress threatens to nullify the very goal it is supposed to realize – the idea of man”. 
Like Roy, Horkheimer points out that Enlightenment reason emerged as a protest 
against religion. But in capitalism, reason turned into an instrument of domination and 
exploitation: “Having given up autonomy, reason has become an instrument. […] Rea-
son has become completely harnessed to the social process. Its operational value, its 
role in the domination of men and nature, has been made the sole criterion” (14-15). 
As a result, “the advance of enlightenment tends at certain points to revert to supersti-
tion and paranoia” (21). “Less and less is anything done for its own sake. […] In the 
view of formalized reason, an activity is reasonable only if it serves another purpose 
[…] In other words, the activity is merely a tool, for it derives its meaning only through 
its connection with other ends” (25). The reduction of reason to a mere instrument 
neutralises reason and calls forth irrationalism: “At the moment of consummation, rea-
son has become irrational and stultified” (87). Liberalism turns into authoritarianism. 
“[L]iberalism and authoritarianism tend to interact in a way that helps to vest an ever 
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more rigid rational control in the institutions of an irrational world” (49). With the rise of 
fascism in Europe, “[r]eason […] ultimately destroyed itself” (Horkheimer 1941, 367). 
Fascism is an irrational rationality: “The new order of Fascism is Reason revealing 
itself as unreason” (1941, 387). 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument is that when reason becomes instrumental rea-
son it not only undermines critique but also calls forth irrational forces that advance 
terroristic systems such as fascism and Stalinism. 
 “Technological rationality” is Herbert Marcuse’s term for what Horkheimer calls “in-
strumental reason”: “Rationality is being transformed from a critical force into one of 
adjustment and compliance. Autonomy of reason loses its meaning in the same meas-
ure as the thoughts, feelings and actions of men are shaped by the technical require-
ments of the apparatus which they have themselves created” (Marcuse 1998/1941, 
49). Marcuse (1988/1965)  argues that technological rationality results in rational irra-
tionality. “In the unfolding of capitalist rationality, irrationality becomes reason” (207); 
“bourgeois reason negates itself in its consummation” (221). Comparably to Hork-
heimer and Marcuse, Roy (1960/1947, 94) argues that fascism makes “man only an 
automation, a robot, a small wheel in a gigantic social machinery”. 
The notions of technological rationality and instrumental reason express several 
dimensions of capitalism and class society: 
 
 Technology as an instrument of domination:  
Technology is, under the conditions of domination and capitalism, the dominant 
groups’ instrument for the exploitation, control, and surveillance of others. 
 Capitalism as social technology:  
Capitalism is a type of social technology that reduces humans to the status of 
workers and consumers and treats them as the instrument, thing, and resource for 
achieving the goal of capital accumulation. Capitalism is a machine that accumu-
lates capital and produces commodities. It alienates humans from their human-
ness.  
 Ideology as the instrumentalization of consciousness:  
In order to reproduce itself, domination requires ideologies that make structures of 
domination appear natural, without alternative, and good. Such ideologies are for 
example consumerism, fascism, nationalism, racism, technocracy, technological 
determinism, neoliberalism, conservatism, militarism, etc. Ideology is a particular 
form of technological rationality that tries to eliminate critical and dialectical 
thought in order to instil blind, uncritical faith in ruling ideas into humans. It in-
volves the attempt to reduce human consciousness to the status of machines. At-
tempts to reify consciousness try to manipulate humans.  
 Technological determinism: 
Technological determinism is a specific form of ideology that sees technology as 
being autonomous from society, as the cause of society’s changes, problems or 
advances.  
 
Since 2008, many societies have experienced profound economic, political and ideo-
logical crises that together have resulted in a surge of new nationalisms and new au-
thoritarianisms (Fuchs 2018; 2020b). Neoliberal capitalism has experienced a new 
negative dialectic of the enlightenment. New nationalisms and authoritarianisms are 
the result of the negative dialectic of neoliberal capitalism and the new imperialism. 
The commodification of everything, entrepreneurialism, privatisation, deregulation, fi-
nancialisation, globalisation, deindustrialisation, outsourcing, precarisation and the 
274     Christian Fuchs 
   CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2019. 
new individualism have backfired, extended and intensified inequalities and crisis 
tendencies, which have created a fertile ground for new nationalisms, right-wing ex-
tremism and new fascism. 
5.2. Nationalism and Fascism 
Roy gives particular attention to the analysis and critique of nationalism and fascism. 
He argues that fascism is a militant and terroristic form of capitalism. The bourgeoisie 
is defending its “waning power with the bloody instruments of Fascist dictatorship” 
(1938, 6); its members throw off “the mask of parliamentarism and wield their dictator-
ship openly” (38). Roy argues that fascism cannot be reduced to monopoly capitalism 
because there are forms of monopoly capitalism without a terroristic state. He rather 
argues that in phases of crisis where fascist movements rise, the capitalist class may 
find fascist rule a means suited for fostering exploitation and capital accumulation and 
might therefore support such movements: 
 
Fascism is the most outstanding phenomenon of contemporary history. It has to 
be explained. It is not enough to call it monopoly capitalism or Hitler Imperialism, 
whatever that curious phrase might mean. It is not historically correct to identify 
Fascism with monopoly capitalism. The latter had been in operation in other coun-
tries years before Fascism rose in Germany. In those countries, Fascists could 
not capture power. On the other hand, Italy, where Fascism first succeeded, was 
an economically backward country. Fascism cannot be explained unless ideolog-
ical antecedents, the cultural atmosphere, are taken into account. The doctrines 
with which Fascism swept to power in Germany can be traced in the ideological 
and cultural history of that country. Fascism also was a result of the dynamics of 
ideas. Monopoly capitalism, more correctly, capitalism in decay, found that those 
ideas could serve its purpose very well (Roy 1960/1947, 68). 
 
Roy argues that fascism is different from imperialism. Fascism is not simply a form of 
imperialism. “Capitalism creates Fascism as the weapon for its last defence, only when 
it can no longer provide the foundation for Imperialism” (Roy 1943, 60). Roy (1989) 
points out that the dialectic of the Enlightenment’s weakening of reason results “in the 
storm of emotions running wild” so that it “is easier to sway the people by appeals to 
their emotions and prejudices than to their reason. […] Therefore, democracy has eve-
rywhere degenerated into demagogy” (468). 
The rise of new authoritarianism has been accompanied by a mass of public dis-
courses that are driven by emotions and ideology. Authoritarians often do not believe 
in anything that can be reasonably explained and proofed, believing only what they 
want to believe and what fits into their ideology. They often distrust intellectuals, ex-
perts, and academia. 
During the campaigns for the 2016 Brexit referendum, Michael Gove, then the Brit-
ish Secretary of State for Justice, declared in a television interview that citizens should 
not and do not trust experts: “I think that people in this country have had enough of 
experts […] from organisations with acronyms, saying that they know what is best and 
get it consistently wrong”.2 Some speak of the rise of an era of post-truth politics. Post-
truth is, however, a rather unspecific and polite term that fails to point out that the 
questioning of expertise aims at the advancement of lies and far-right ideology. Donald 
                                            
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGgiGtJk7MA, accessed on 13 September 2019. 
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Trump has perfected the practice of declaring any expertise that questions him to be 
invalid and false. Figure 1 shows an example. 
 
Figure 1: A tweet by Donald Trump about the mainstream media. Source: https://twit-
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/832708293516632065 
In the tweet shown in Figure 1, Donald Trump characterises certain mainstream media 
(New York Times, ABC, CBS, CNN, NBC) that often report critically about him as “the 
fake news media”. He thereby identifies himself as the ultimate speaker and repre-
sentative of the American people and implies that criticism of him is anti-American and 
directed against Americans. Critics of Trump are presented as “the enemy of the Amer-
ican people”. Driven by ideology, irrationality, and emotions, Trump and his followers 
imagine any criticism and facts not fitting their ideology as inventions. They only believe 
things that fit into their ideology to be true. Such a demagogic politics aims at radical-
ising followers and their hatred of identified enemies. It has dangerous, anti-democratic 
potentials because stoking hatred can easily spill over into violence. 
A comparison of critical theories of fascism and authoritarianism shows that there 
are four elements of right-wing authoritarian ideology, practices, and movements 
(Fuchs 2018; 2020b): authoritarian leadership, nationalism, the friend/enemy-scheme, 
and militant patriarchy. Figure 2 visualises the interaction of these four dimensions. 
Right-wing authoritarianism has an ideological role. By fetishizing the illusionary col-
lective of the nation, right-wing authoritarianism distracts attention from actual class 
conflicts and class structures. Fascism is a movement that uses terror as its means for 
advancing capitalism, authoritarianism, nationalism, division, militancy, and patriarchy. 
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Figure 2: A model of right-wing authoritarianism (Fuchs 2018) 
Roy identifies all four features of this model as key dimensions of fascism. 
5.2.1. Authoritarian Leadership 
The “cult of Superman” is a central feature of fascism (Roy 1938, 40): “A Mussolini or 
Hitler is the personification of the cult of superman” (1938, 53). In fascism, “the State 
is everything and the individual citizen has no right to exist except as pawn of the ab-
solute power which may gamble away his life whenever it pleases” (53). 
Authoritarianism uses a “mass psychology dominated by the fear of freedom” 
(2006/1945, 13); “The fear of freedom created Fascism in Europe” (2006/1945, 15). 
The “flight from freedom […] is the basic social and cultural asset of Fascism” (23). 
This flight favours the belief in the need for top-down leadership and a Führer. When 
speaking of the flight from freedom it is evident that Roy (2006/1945) was influenced 
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by Erich Fromm’s (1969/1941) book Escape from Freedom, published in 1941. Fromm 
in this book analyses the rise of fascism in Europe: “The giant forces in society and the 
danger for man’s survival have increased […], and hence man’s tendency to escape 
from freedom” (1969/1941, xiii). Roy does not explicitly acknowledge the connection 
to Fromm’s works. He does not cite or mention Escape from Freedom or Fromm. 
Fromm himself also became aware of Roy’s work. In his book The Sane Society, 
Fromm (2002/1956, 55) describes Roy’s book Reason, Romanticism and Revolution 
as a “thorough and brilliant analysis”. Roy’s journal The Radical Humanist published 
articles by Erich Fromm (Manjapra 2010, 160-161). 
5.2.2. Nationalism 
For Roy, nationalism is an ideology that fetishizes the nation. He therefore speaks of 
“national jingoism” (1938, 89). As a humanist, he politically despised any form of na-
tionalism and argued that nationalism is an element of fascism: “Fascism is nationalism 
inspired by revivalist ideals” (1938, 40); “The essence of nationalism is to place the 
interests of one’s own country above the interests of the world” (1942, 7); “There is a 
spiritual affinity between nationalism and Fascism, the latter being only the most ex-
travagant and aggressive form of the former” (1942, 22-23). Roy argues that Marxism 
is interested in social problems and conflicts while nationalism “has no reference to 
social problems” (2006/1945, 85). Nationalism demands the sacrifice of the individual 
to the nation. “The essence of Nationalism, the denial of the very existence of the indi-
vidual, manifests itself fully in Fascism” (2006/1945, 29). Roy sees nationalism as a 
metaphysical and irrational ideology that fetishizes the nation: 
Nazism and Fascism are condemned as totalitarian because they deny the sov-
ereignty of the individual; they do not give the individual any place in society 
except as a cog in a vast machinery with a collective ego. […] Nationalism, by 
its internal logic, cannot but be totalitarian, because it also postulates a collec-
tive ego – the nation. It is a metaphysical concept; yet, human beings, of flesh 
and blood, must sacrifice everything to make the nation great and glorious. That 
is the essence of Nationalism. That is, to sacrifice a reality at the altar of a fiction, 
of an illusion (Roy 1960/1947, 110-111). 
There are parallels of Roy’s critical theories of nationalism in the works of Rosa Lux-
emburg and Eric J. Hobsbawm (see Fuchs 2020b). Luxemburg and Hobsbawm, like 
Roy, stress the illusionary and fictive character of nationalist ideology. Luxemburg 
(1976/1909, 135) writes that nationalists see the nation as “a homogeneous social and 
political entity”, remarking that the nation is a “misty veil” concealing the “definite his-
torical content” of class society (135). For Hobsbawm (1983a; 1983b; 1992), national-
ism is an invented, which means fabricated and therefore illusionary, tradition that 
serves the interests of the capitalist class.  
Roy (2006/1945, 85) argues that anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles that are 
nationalist in character are “pseudo-Marxist”: 
 
The pseudo-Marxist theory of anti-Imperialism […] panders to the base sentiment 
of race hatred, and consequently plays into the hands of social reaction. The 
doctrine of united anti-Imperialist Front divorces political practice from the context 
of social conflicts, and making it an expression of racial animosity, helps the up-
per-class minority to use the people as a pawn in the game of power-politics. 
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Providing nationalist power-politics with a pseudo-theoretical foundation, anti-Im-
perialism helps Nationalism to hide its reactionary social purpose. The misalli-
ance with Nationalism compels Marxism to betray itself (2006/1945, 84-85).  
5.2.3. The Friend/Enemy-Scheme 
The friend/enemy-scheme is the ideological construction of enemies who are blamed 
for society’s problems. Racism, anti-Semitism, anti-socialism, and anti-Marxism are 
typical enemy constructions that can be found in fascist ideology. Roy argues that fas-
cism is driven by “fanatical race hatred” (1938, 143) and “unscrupulous slander against 
the opponents, [… the] fanning of race prejudice” (1938, 89). Fascism wants to destroy 
Marxism (93). The “object of Fascism is the destruction of the weak and the triumph of 
the strong” (133). 
5.2.4. Militarism  
Capitalism is a “violent form of capitalist domination” (1938, 38). Fascism implements 
“arbitrary power and unbounded will” (53): “The Fascist state is the instrument of the 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie divested of the deceit of parliamentary democracy”  
(87). Fascism is a capitalist system that is based on rule of terror. Fascism is “avowedly 
imperialist” (148), which implies the use of violence and terror for the expansion of 
capitalist influence.  
5.3. The Frankfurt School on Fascism 
Roy’s understanding of fascism resonates with that of the Frankfurt School (Jani 2017). 
Like Roy, Adorno and Horkheimer identify four dimensions of fascism. 
In respect to authoritarian leadership, Adorno argues that the fascist leader pre-
sents himself as a great little man, “a person who suggests both omnipotence and the 
idea that he is just one of the folks” (1951, 142). Collective narcissism is a psycholog-
ical dimension of authoritarianism, because it results in the psychological “enlargement 
of the subject: by making the leader his ideal he loves himself, as it were, but gets rid 
of the stains of frustration and discontent which mar his picture of his own empirical 
self” (Adorno 1951, 140).  
In the context of nationalism, Adorno argues that fascists need forms of repressive 
egalitarianism. Fascist demagogues make use of the logic of repressive egalitarianism: 
“They emphasize their being different from the outsider but play down such differences 
within their own group and tend to level out distinctive qualities among themselves with 
the exception of the hierarchical one” (Adorno 1991, 146). Nationalism is a form of 
repressive egalitarianism. 
 Adorno argues that fascists think and act based on the logic of the friend/enemy-
scheme. The right-wing demagogue “cannot help feeling surrounded by traitors, and 
so continuously threatens to exterminate them” (1975, 78). According to Adorno, iden-
tification with the leader and hatred against the out-group allows emotional release 
(1975, 16-20). Such a release of aggression encourages “excess and violence” (1975, 
17). 
Adorno stresses that fascists see the military as the model for politics and society 
and soldiers as ideal individuals. They consider war, violence, weapons and guns as 
the best means of handling conflicts. The “model of the military officer” is “transferred 
to the realm of politics” (1975, 49). Love towards the leader is an “emotional compen-
sation for the cold, self-alienated life of most people” (1975, 37). For fascists, survival, 
toughness, strength and the willingness to fight, lead and compete are moral norms. 
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Any “reference to love is almost completely excluded”, and the “traditional role of the 
loving father” is replaced “by the negative one of threatening authority” (Adorno 1991, 
137). Horkheimer (2004/1947, 14) points out that nationalism ends in terror: “The idea 
of the national community (Volksgemeinschaft) first, first set up as an idol, can even-
tually only be maintained by terror”.  
6. Conclusions 
This article engaged with foundations of M. N. Roy’s theory and compared his ap-
proach to the Frankfurt School. The first question it asked was: How can M. N. Roy’s 
radical, Marxist humanism inform the critical study of communication, culture, technol-
ogy, the human being, fascism, and nationalism? We can summarise the main findings 
in respect to the themes of humanism, technology, culture/communication, and ideol-
ogy: 
Humanism 
 For Roy, humanism is a romantic movement that stresses the transformative capac-
ity of human beings so that they can collectively make their own history.  
 For Roy, humanism is a movement for economic, political and cultural democracy, 
a movement for a participatory democracy that is based on co-operatives and net-
works of local assemblies. 
 Although Roy appreciates Marx’s humanism, he argues that there is a fatalistic ten-
dency in Marx’s works that sees history as being determined by dialectical economic 
laws, advances moral relativism, and ignores the importance of human essence for 
humanism and democracy. Roy’s interpretation was not able to take into account 
some of Marx’s important works, especially the Economic and Philosophic Manu-
scripts, where Marx engages with the notions of human essence as social, creative, 
self-conscious, productive beings and capitalism/class society as alienation from the 
human essence in order to ground a humanist-communist philosophy and politics. 
 Roy misinterprets Marx’s use of Hegelian dialectics. For Marx, dialectics is not 
simply an objective law but, in society, also operates at the level of the human sub-
ject and its social relations, which means that class struggle is an open, dialectical 
process that has the potential to change society’s history. There is a dialectic of the 
subjective dialectic and the objective dialectic. Class struggle as the making and 
unmaking of class relations between the exploited and the exploited is the subjective 
dimension of history. It does not make sense to oppose Marx the humanist and Marx 
the Hegelian. Marx’s dialectic is humanist and his humanism dialectical. 
 Engaging and updating the works of humanist socialists such as Roy reminds us 
that democratic socialism is the strongest weapon against fascism, nationalism, and 
war. 
Technology 
 Roy opposed Gandhi’s nationalism and his vision of an ethical capitalism. He argues 
that Gandhi’s politics of a simple life is a form of pessimistic technological determin-
ism, opposed to industry and modern technologies and thereby celebrating poverty 
and toil, which support capitalist interests. 
 Roy stresses the dialectical character of modern technology; that is, its potential to 
advance slavery and freedom. The actual effects of science and technology depend 
on human interests, social relations and human practices in these relations. 
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 While Gandhi was an anti-modernist, Roy argues for an alternative, socialist-hu-
manist modernity that shapes, creates and uses technologies in manners that abol-
ish toil and advance freedom, democracy and sustainability. 
Communication and Culture 
 Roy advances a materialist monist position, which states that the entire world is 
material.  
 Roy sees the brain as humans’ key means of production and humans as thinking 
beings capable of conceptual, creative, anticipatory thought. What needs to be 
added to Roy’s approach is the crucial role of work and production in human exist-
ence. Humans are thinking, creative, social, producing, communicating beings. So-
cial production combines the work character of communication and the communi-
cative character of work. 
 Roy challenges the assumption that culture and ideas are reducible to the economy. 
 Roy’s critique of economic determinism during his last, humanist phase of intellec-
tual development was partly also self-criticism of his earlier thought that, based on 
Plekhanov, saw productive forces and especially geography as determining society.  
 Society only exists in and through humans’ social relations. Culture as the produc-
tion and circulation of ideas and meanings takes place within the ensemble of social 
relations that constitutes the human subject. 
 Culture cannot be reduced to political economy; however, it is also not fully inde-
pendent but grounded in the economy, and at the same time relatively autonomous. 
Ideas and culture cannot be read off the mode of production. We can learn from Roy 
that a mode of production influences but does not determine forms of culture. 
 In the communication process, humans establish relations between their minds and 
thereby between individuals that constitute, produce, and reproduce the social 
world. They produce and reproduce social relations. 
Ideology 
 Roy argues that utilitarian liberalism created a negative dialectic of the Enlighten-
ment. Liberal individualism and atomism, expressing itself as the exploitation of 
wage-workers, the fetishization of private property, capital accumulation, cut-throat 
competition, and the logic of the accumulation of capital in the economy and of 
power in the state-system, has backfired. The social void it created has been filled 
with movements for repressive collectivism, namely fascism and Stalinism. 
Whereas liberal individualism fetishizes the individual at the expense of social free-
dom, fascism and Stalinism fetishize the collectives of the nation and the state at 
the expense of individual freedom. 
 Roy identifies four key elements of fascism: authoritarian leadership, nationalism, 
the friend/enemy-scheme, and militarism. He opposes any form of nationalism be-
cause he sees nationalism as the irrational ideological foundation of fascism. Roy 
stresses that fascism is a violent and terroristic form of capitalism.  
 
The second question that this article asked was: What commonalities are there be-
tween Roy’s approach and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School? We can summa-
rise the main findings:  
 
 There are strong parallels between Roy’s and Herbert Marcuse’s analysis of modern 
technology. Like Roy, Marcuse rejects anti-technological ideology that celebrates 
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toil; Marcuse, like Roy, identifies both emancipatory and repressive potentials of 
modern technology and argues that the actual character and impact of technology 
depends on broader societal contexts, interests and struggles; Marcuse, like Roy, 
argues for a socialist modernity where technology is shaped and used in manners 
that overcome toil and advance freedom, and technology is governed in a demo-
cratic manner. 
 Roy was critical of positivism. His critique of the fetishism of mathematics and cal-
culation resonates with the approaches of Georg Lukács, Theodor W. Adorno, Max 
Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Alfred Sohn-Rethel, and Jürgen Habermas, who crit-
icised positivism for lacking an understanding of the qualitative and dialectical char-
acter of the world.  
 There are parallels between Roy’s analysis of how liberalism turned against itself 
into fascism and Stalinism and Horkheimer/Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
Roy’s analysis of fascism is influenced by Erich Fromm’s hypothesis of the escape 
from freedom. Roy, just like the Frankfurt School, sees authoritarian leadership, na-
tionalism, the friend/enemy-scheme, and militarism as key features of fascist ideol-
ogy and fascist movements.  
 Roy, like Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, argues that Stalinism and fascism are 
expressions of how the reason of Enlightenment, and liberalism that questioned re-
ligious and feudal rule, turned against Enlightenment values. Capitalism individual-
ises and instrumentalizes humans, which undermines social cohesion and espe-
cially in crisis times calls forth reactionary forces that fetishize false and imaginary 
collectives such as the nation, race, and the absolute state. 
 Like Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adorno, Roy stresses that authoritarianism and fas-
cism try to treat humans like robots. This is the phenomenon of instrumental reason 
and technological rationality. Instrumental reason/technological rationality has four 
dimensions: technology as an instrument of domination, capitalism as social tech-
nology, ideology as the instrumentalization of consciousness, and technological de-
terminism. 
 
Both Roy and first-generation Frankfurt School authors such as Max Horkheimer, The-
odor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm were inspired by Marx and hu-
manist philosophy. The major difference between Roy and the Frankfurt School is that 
Roy analysed both Western and non-Western society, including India and China, 
based on Marxist humanism, whereas the Frankfurt School had to limit its analysis to 
Europe, the United States, and Russia. Marxist humanism is a universal approach that 
is suited for the analysis of domination, exploitation, ideology, and social struggles in 
different parts of the world.  
Roy’s approach shows that the claim that Marxian theory, socialism, and humanism 
are Western- or Euro-centric and therefore cultural imperialist approaches is errone-
ous. Whereas Dipesh Chakrabarty (2008, 4) argues that Roy was one of the “illustrious 
members” of the “modern Bengali educated middle classes” that “warmly embraced 
the themes of rationalism, science, equality, and human rights that the European En-
lightenment promulgated”, Kris Manjapra (2010) argues in his book about Roy that the 
latter was not “entrapped in the ideologies attendant to global capital” (xviii), but an 
“anti-colonial cosmopolitan thinker” (xxi).  
Robert Spencer (2017) maintains that post-colonial scholars often tar “all human-
isms with the same brush” (121) and “champion difference at the expense of equality” 
and identity politics over class politics so that to “be a postcolonialist, it seems, is to 
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leave one’s humanism at the door” (124). Spencer argues for a humanist postcoloni-
alism that is “exercised above all not by crimes against hybridity but by crimes against 
humanity” (122), that stresses the human “capacity for self-creation” (128) and that 
speaks “the language of rights […] animated by the conviction that there are irreducible 
features of human life” (128) because “it is convinced that only by eradicating the most 
devastating forms of inhumanity will the human, with all its variability and unpredicta-
bleness, come into its own” (129). Humanism means “critical thinking + the ideal of 
solidarity” (152).  
Marxist/socialist humanism allows us to approach the global world as a unity of 
diverse tendencies. It is an approach that enables the analysis of society in different 
contexts based on what Vivek Chibber calls the two universalisms, “the universal logic 
of capital (suitably defined) and social agents’ universal interest in their well-being, 
which impels them to resist capital’s expansionary drive” (2013, 291). The first univer-
salism foregrounds the accumulation of economic, political and cultural power that in 
different contexts and on different levels of organisation of global society creates vari-
ous inequalities. The second universalism calls for solidarity of the world’s oppressed 
and exploited in their struggles for a better world. One of the “recurring themes” in 
Roy’s works and thought is “the reading of underling unity out of apparent difference” 
(Manjapra 2010, 168). 
Both in the West and the Global South, we today are experiencing a surge of new 
nationalisms and new authoritarianisms. Far-right movements and new nationalisms 
are the “cicatrices and scars of a democracy […] that until today has still not lived up 
to its own concept” (Adorno 2019/1968, 18). They are the result of the negative dialec-
tic of neoliberal capitalism and the new imperialism. The commodification of every-
thing, entrepreneurialism, privatisation, deregulation, financialisation, capitalist global-
isation, the new imperialism, deindustrialisation, outsourcing, precarisation and the 
new individualism have backfired, extending and intensifying inequalities and crisis 
tendencies, which have created a fertile ground for new nationalisms, right-wing ex-
tremism and new fascism.  
Three of the main challenges and global problems that humanity faces today are 
a) the threats of exploding inequalities, accelerating and deepening political-economic 
crises, fascism, war, violence and genocide posed by the rise of authoritarian capital-
ism and new nationalisms, b) the threat posed to humans and the environment by 
natural disasters, climate change and the global environmental crisis, and c) new forms 
of control and exploitation in the context of capitalist digital technologies, AI-based au-
tomation, and algorithmic politics. 
The political-economic crisis, the environmental crisis, and the digital crisis have in 
common that they are crises that threaten fundamental aspects of human life, namely 
democracy, survival of the species and the planet, and self-fulfilment. They are crises 
of humanity. The three crises together radicalise the alienation of humans from nature, 
the economy, political systems, and culture to the point that the interaction of these 
crises can in the future result in a breakdown of humanity and the livelihood of future 
generations. We need radical alternatives. As Alderson and Spencer state, “The Left 
[…] requires a compelling vision of the future as more just, democratic, ecologically 
sustainable and subjectively satisfying around which it will be possible to construct a 
viable counter-hegemony” (2017, 218). Radical humanism is important today because 
it advances the counter-vision of a humane society against the dystopias the three 
crises could result in. Radical humanism can thereby inform social struggles. Radical 
humanism struggles for the strengthening of the political-economic commons (com-
mon control of political and economic organisations), the natural commons (common 
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survival in a natural environment that interacts with humans in sustainable manners), 
and the knowledge and digital commons (knowledge, culture, and digital resources as 
common goods).   
In the age of new nationalisms and authoritarian capitalism, global environmental 
crises, capitalist crisis, and the digital crisis, socialist-humanist theories such as that of 
M. N. Roy can inspire struggles for a humanist and socialist society as antidotes to the 
acceleration and deepening of the three crises. In his Principles of Radical Democracy, 
Roy (1953, 52-62) formulates 22 theses. The final one should be seen as the starting 
point for contemporary socialist, anti-fascist and anti-nationalist struggles:  
Radicalism starts from the dictum that ‘man is the measure of everything’ (Pro-
tagoras) or ‘man is the root of mankind’ (Marx), and advocates reconstruction 
of the world as a commonwealth and fraternity of free […] [humans], by the col-
lective endeavour of spiritually emancipated moral […] [humans] (Roy 1953, 
62). 
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